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(prázdné)
Jonathan L. Kvanvig presents a new account of rationality, Perspectivalism, which both avoids elevating rationality so that only the most reflective of us are capable of rational beliefs, and avoids reducing it to the level of beasts. He defends optionality about what it is reasonable to think,...
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Jonathan L. Kvanvig presents a new account of rationality, Perspectivalism, which both avoids elevating rationality so that only the most reflective of us are capable of rational beliefs, and avoids reducing it to the level of beasts. He defends optionality about what it is reasonable to think, and provides a framework for rational disagreement.
schovat popis
- Nakladatel: Oxford University Press
- Kód:
- Rok vydání: 2014
- Jazyk: Angličtina
- Vazba: Vázaná
- Počet stran: 208
- Šířka balení: 15.7 cm
- Výška balení: 24.1 cm
- Hloubka balení: 1.7 cm
- Váha balení: 460 g
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