zboží
(prázdné)
Argues that self-knowledge of our intentional states is special among all the knowledge we have because it is not an epistemological notion in the standard sense of that term, but instead is a fallout of the radically normative nature of thought and agency.
číst celé
Argues that self-knowledge of our intentional states is special among all the knowledge we have because it is not an epistemological notion in the standard sense of that term, but instead is a fallout of the radically normative nature of thought and agency.
schovat popis
- Nakladatel: Harvard University Press
- Kód:
- Rok vydání: 2012
- Jazyk: Angličtina
- Vazba: Brožovaná
- Počet stran: 416
- Šířka balení: 23.6 cm
- Výška balení: 15.9 cm
- Hloubka balení: 3 cm
- Váha balení: 492 g
Recenze